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Scott Grunsted 
Appellant, Pro Se 
9323 N Government Way #252 
Hayden, ID 83835 
208-772-0752 
Scott@mymail.net 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
SCOTT A. GRUNSTED, 
Defendant/ Appellant 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
39736-2012 
APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL 
BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai Comity the Honorable 
Benjamin R. Simpson presiding. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Scott A. Grunsted 
Pro Se 
9323 N Government Way #252 
Hayden, ID 83835 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: Office of the Idaho Attorney General 
By: William A. von Tagen 
Deputy Attorney General 
800 Park Blvd., Plaza IV 
Boise, ID 83722-0401 
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 (1945) 
Total Success Invest. v. Ada Highway Dist., 227 P. 3d 942, 950 (IdahoApp. 2010) 
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Statement of the Case 
On August 9, 2011, Appellant was served by Respondent with a Notice of Alternative Writ of 
Mandate, Affidavit of Service # 109902. Per Appellant's Motion for Extension of Time ( 60 
days) by an Order issued September 23, 2011, The District Court extended the 20 day response 
requirement due to the death of the Appellant's mother on August 11,201 L Otherwise, 
Appellant responded in a timely manner. On October 28, 2011, Appellant entered a Show 
Cause, which was followed on November 14, 2011 by Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. A hearing was scheduled, and subsequently held in 
the First District Court on February 1, 2012. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
granted. Appellant submitted a Motion to Dismiss - Lack of Constitutional Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction, accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of same. Tbis Motion and 
Memorandum were set aside and ignored by the District Court Judge. Appellant now seeks 
relief from this Abuse of Discretion. The Brief to follow includes the text of said Motion and 
Memorandum. The people, in the documents written by them which established our nation and 
state, intended that the judicial system have as its primary charge the jealous guardianship of 
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their natural, God given rights. Appellant is enjoining this court to take this mandate seriously 
by preventing his opponent from pursuing deprivation of said rights. 
Issues .Presented on Appeal 
1) Whether the district court erred by failing to consider, and rule on, Appellant Motion 
to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction before ruling on the Idaho State Tax 
Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment and entering its Peremptory Writ of Mandate? 
2) Whether the district court erred in holding that Appellant failed to offer substantial reason 
for not filing state tax returns for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008? 
3) Whether the district court erred in holding that Appellant Grunsted failed to show good cause 
why he did not file state tax returns for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008? 
4) Whether the district court erred in entering summary judgment and issuing a 
Peremptory Writ of Mandate against Appellant? 
Argument 
Assignment of Error #1: JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES MUST BE HEARD FIRST 
1. A court must first address a jurisdictional challenge raised by a party. State v. Kerrigan, 3141 
P. 3d 1054, 1056 (Idaho 2006). Questions of jurisdiction, even those not raised below, "should 
be addressed prior to considering the merits of an appeal." Henderson v. 5ECLIPSE TRAFFIC 
CONTROL, 213 P. 3d 718, 722 (Idaho 2009). Issues of jurisdiction are considered fundamental 
and "cannot be ignored when brought to our attention." Id. 
Questions of jurisdiction, even those not raised below, "should be addressed prior to considering 
the merits of an appeal. 11 Id. 
JUDGMENTS ENTERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION ARE VOID: 
2. Not only should a court have jurisdiction of the question which its judgment assumes to 
decide, it is also is necessary to the validity of a judgment that the court have the jurisdiction to 
-6-
render a judgment for the particular remedy or relief which the judgment undertakes to grant. 
2 Baldwin v. Anderson. 51 Idaho 614, 617; 8 P.2d 461,462 (1932). 
3 3. An example of a court failing to have jurisdiction to render a judgment for the particular 
4 remedy or relief which the judgment undertakes to grant is not v.rithin ajurisdictional amount. 
5 When the complaint seeks more than the jurisdictional amount for which the court is authorized 
6 to enter judgment, the court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Nalder v. Crest 
7 Corporation, 472 P. 2d 310,315 (Idaho 1970). This is known as jurisdiction to render a judgment 
8 for the particular remedy. Id. 
9 4. Granted that if a court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of an action, its 
10 judgment may nevertheless be void if it does not have jurisdiction to render the particular relief 
11 which the judgment undertakes to grant. Maloney v. Zipf, 41 Idaho 30,237 P. 632; Baldwin v. 
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Anderson, supra; Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P.2d 281. 
Judgments may be entered in cases where the court has undoubted jurisdiction over the subject-
matter, and of the parties, yet nevertheless may be void because the court decided some question 
which it had no power to decide, or granted some relief which it had no power to grant. Martin v. 
Soden, 340 P.2d 848, 854 (Idaho 1959). 
5. It is possible for various illegalities to deprive a trial court of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ex parte 
Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176 (1874) (no jurisdiction to impose second sentence in violation of 
Double Jeopardy Clause); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-377 (1880) (no jurisdiction to try 
defendant for violation of unconstitutional statute); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (no 
jurisdiction to conduct trial in atmosphere of mob domination); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 
(1923) (same); Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458,468 (1938) (no jurisdiction to conduct trial that 
violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
·7-
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6. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and unenforceable. Baldwin v. Anderson, 
supra; Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, 195 P. 625 (1921 ); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments, § 22, p. 
3 327. If a court grants relief which under no circumstances it has any 
4 
5 
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authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void. 
7. It is also fundamental that a writ of execution based on an invalid or void judgment is itself 
invalid. Garren v. Rollis, 85 Idaho 86,375 P.2d 994 (1962); Evans v. City of American Falls, 52 
Idaho 7, 11 P.2d 363 (1932). Nalder v. Crest Corporation,supra. 
8. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides an additional procedural overlay protecting rights. Kolp v. Bd. Of Trustees Of 3 Butte 
IO Cty. Joint, 629 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Idaho 1981). 
11 9. A valid judgment must be rendered in compliance with the constitutional requirements of due 
12 process. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946). 
13 10. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) made the Fifth Amendment, and the jurisprudence 
14 developed thereunder, applicable in the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
15 Clause. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961) made the Fourth Amendment applicable in the states 
16 via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 
17 11. The Boyd v. United States case cited in Appellant's supporting memorandum is old, but, it 
18 was cited as recently as Stern v. Marshall,131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011) and Google Scholar shows it as 
19 being cited over 9000 times. Idaho courts have cited to and applied Boyd as recently as 1997. 
20 Assignment of Errors #2, 3 and 4: Did the Court err in holding that Appellant failed to offer 
21 substantial reason and show good cause for not filing state tax returns for the years 2006, 2007, 
22 and 2008, and subsequently enter a summary judgment and issue a Peremptory Writ of Mandate 
23 against Appellant? 
24 
25 
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY (WITH FACTS INTERSPERSED AS THEY APPLY): 
1. Plaintiff/Respondent filed and served his complaint seeking a mandate from this Court 
that Appellant file a tax return for certain years. This Court issued an alternative writ to which 
Appellant responded with a verified response. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to 
which Appellant is responding with this motion to dismiss alleging that the Constitution for the 
United States, in particular, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as they apply to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment; in addition to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
itself have deprived this Court of the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to enter the order the 
plaintiff requests. 
2. In Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886) (Boyd hereafter), on the trial of the cause 
it became important to show the quantity and value of the glass contained in twenty-nine cases 
previously imported. Id. @ 618. To do this the district attorney offered in evidence an order 
made by the District Judge under§ 5 of the same act of June 22, 1874, directing notice 
under seal of the court to be given to the claimants, requiring them to produce the invoice 
of the twenty-nine cases. Id. In similar manner in this instant action the Court held in Mitchell 
v. Agents of State, 105 Idaho 419; 670 P.2d 520,526 (1983) about LC. 63-3030A, "I am 
satisfied that our Idaho legislation carried the same intent, i.e., that it is a discovery 
proceeding ... " 
3. The claimants, in obedience to the notice, but objecting to its validity and to the 
constitutionality of the law, produced the invoice; and when it was offered in evidence by 
the district attorney they objected to its reception on the ground that, in a suit for 
forfeiture, no evidence can be compelled from the claimants themselves, and also that the 
statute, so far as it compels production of evidence to be used against the claimants is 
unconstitutional and void. Boyd,@ 618. The Act (Act hereafter) that the trial court used as 
authority for issuing the order was said to provide for the more certain and speedy Collection of 
-9-
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Claims in Favor of the United States. Id.@ 621. The Act in question was said to have been the 
2 first legislation of the kind that ever appeared on the statute book of the United States. Id. In 
3 similar manner it was held in Mitchell v. Agents of State, 105 Idaho 419; 670 P .2d 520, 526 
4 (1983), "While mandamus as an extraordinary remedy and special proceeding has an ancient 
5 history, its use to compel the filing of tax returns is a recent development." Boyd argued that the 
6 Act in question was repugnant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. The United States (US 
7 hereafter) argued that the Act was free from constitutional objection, because it did not authorize 
8 the search and seizure of books and papers, but only required the defendant or claimant to 
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produce them. Id. In a similar manner, in Mitchell, supra @ 526 (1983) the Court held that: 
" ... millions of taxpayers throughout the United States are faced each year with making 
the same or a comparable verification or certification. If they have complex tax problems 
they can always furnish the information to a tax expert and have the expert sign the return 
as the preparer. While the petitioner might lack sophistication as to all of the 
ramifications of the term "taxable income", I venture to assume that any young school-
boy knows what "wages" and "salaries" are, and that is what is called for on line 10 of the 
return. Where the "wages" are reflected in a W-2 form all the person needs to be able to 
do is read and write to copy those figures on his return. 
"All that a taxpayer who signs the complete verification or certification has to do to avoid 
prosecution for perjury or filing a false or fraudulent return is make an honest and 
reasonable effort to supply the information called for with a good faith and reasonable 
belief that it is accurate ... " 
The Boyd Court pointed out that even though that was the case, the Act declared that if Boyd did 
not produce them, the allegations which it is affirmed they will prove shall be taken as confessed. 
Boyd @ 621. In a similar manner, the Idaho Tax Commission thinks they know what income 
Appellant already has, they are simply trying to get the Appellant to report any they don't know 
about. Similarly, in an LC. 63-3O30A preceding the Court will give Appellant a go to jail card if 
Appellant doesn't file the return the State is demanding. The Boyd Court pointed out that this 
was tantamount to compelling their production; for the prosecuting attorney would always be 
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sure to state the evidence expected to be derived from them as strongly as the case will admit Id. 
@ 622. The Boyd Court then held: 
"It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's private papers 
to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and 
seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and 
purpose of search and seizure." Id. (Emphasis mine). 
The Boyd Court said further about the Act in question in that case: 
"It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, such as forcible 
entry into a man's house and searching amongst his papers, are wanting, and to this extent 
the proceeding under the act of 1874 is a mitigation of that which was authorized by the 
former acts; but it accomplishes the substantial object of those acts in forcing from a 
party evidence against himself." Id. (Emphasis mine). 
The Boyd Court then went on to consider whether the compulsory production of a man's private 
papers, to be used in evidence against him in a proceeding to forfeit his property for alleged 
fraud against the revenue laws was an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Id.@ 622. The Boyd Court noted the counsel for the 
government's position was that the Act was a legitimate proceeding, sanctioned by long usage, 
and the authority of judicial decision. Id. Similarly in this case the Plaintiff has argued, ""The 
Court has also ruled that the writ of mandate is a proper remedy to compel the filing of a state 
income tax return and its use does not violate the taxpayer's right under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments." And also along the same lines in this instant case, it was held in Idaho State Tax 
Com'n v. Payton, 688 P. 2d 1163, 1164 (Idaho 1984), " ... appellant has shown no privacy or 
other Fourth Amendment right violated by the Writ of Mandate." The Boyd Court said that it did 
not find any long usage, or any contemporary construction of the Constitution, which would 
justify any of the acts of Congress under consideration. Id. The Boyd Court summarized the 
proceedings before it as: 
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" ... the court attempts to extort from the party his private books and papers to make 
him liable for a penalty or to forfeit his property." (Emphasis mine). 
4. In similar manner in the instant case the Plaintiff writes, "Failure to file and pay the 
tax due can result in a range of civil and criminal penalties." Letter of William A. von Tagen 
dated May 9, 20 I I attached to the affidavit of Shelley Sheridan in support of Petition for Writ of 
Mandate. 
The Boyd Court than began a discussion on the history of the Fourth Amendment by saying: 
"The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue 
officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled 
goods, which James Otis pronounced "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most 
destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles oflaw, that ever was found 
in an English law book;" since they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every 
petty officer."" Id.@ 625. (Emphasis mine). 
The Boyd Court, in discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment, also discussed the practice 
of issuing general warrants by the Secretary of State, for searching private houses for the 
discovery and seizure of books and papers that might be used to convict their owner of the 
charge of libel. Id. @ 626. In discussing the embodiment of English Common Law in the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court found this quote to be relevant: 
"Lastly, it is urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a means of detecting 
offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases had been shown, where the law 
forceth evidence out of the owner's custody by process. There is no process against 
papers in civil causes. It has been often tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the 
adversary has by force or fraud got possession of your own proper evidence, there is no 
way to get it back but by action. In the criminal law such a proceeding was never 
heard of; and yet there are some crimes, such, for instance, as murder, rape, 
robbery, and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more 
atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-search in these cases to 
help forward the conviction. Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law 
towards criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to 
the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. It is very certain that the law 
obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-
accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and 
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un,just; and it would seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same 
principle. Then, too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty." 
"After a few further observations, his Lordship concluded thus: 
"I have now taken notice of everything that has been urged upon the present point; and 
upon the whole we are all of opinion, that the warrant to seize and carry away the 
party's papers in the case of a seditious libel, is illegal and void." Id. @ 628 
(Emphasis mine). 
5. In Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) the Court collected together more recent 
jurisprudence arriving at the same conclusion: 
"But claims of overriding interests are not unusual in Fifth Amendment litigation, and 
they have not fared well. 
"In McCarthy v. Amdstein, supra, the United States insisted that, because of the 
strong public interest in marshaling and distributing assets of bankrupts, the Fifth 
Amendment should not protect a bankrupt during the official examinations 
mandated by the Bankruptcy Act. That position did not prevail. The bankrupt's 
testimony could be had, but only if he were afforded sufficient immunity to supplant 
the privilege. And long before McCarthy v. Amdstein, the Court recognized that 
without the compelled testimony of knowledgeable and perhaps implicated 
witnesses, the enforcement of the transportation laws "would become impossible," 
but nevertheless proceeded on a basis that witnesses must be granted adequate 
immunity if their evidence was to be compelled. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S., at 610. 
Similarly, the enforcement of the antitrust laws against private corporations was at 
stake in Hale v. Henkel, supra, but immunity was essential to command the testimony 
of individual witnesses. Also, it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the 
interest of the States in the enforcement of their ordinary criminal laws; but the price for 
incriminating answers from third-party witnesses is sufficient immunity to satisfy the 
imperatives of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
Finally, in almost the very context here involved, this Court has only recently held that 
employees of the State do not forfeit their constitutional privilege and that they may be 
compelled to respond to questions about the performance of their duties but only if their 
answers cannot be used against them in subsequent criminal prosecutions. Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Sanitation Men 
v. Sanitation Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968). Lefkowitz, supra 78-9. (emphasis mine) 
In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) the Court specifically addressed the interplay of the 
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taxing power and rights by saying: 
"But the Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific 
power to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers are always subject to the 
limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific 
provisions of the Constitution. For example, Congress is granted broad power to "lay 
and collect Taxes," fn2 but the taxing power, broad as it is, may not be invoked in 
such a way as to violate the privilege against self-incrimination." Id.@ 29. (emphasis 
mine) 
The Boyd Court went on to apply the principles arising from the above opinion issuing from a 
court in England by saying: 
"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional 
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before 
the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of 
the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies 
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never 
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence, - it is the invasion of this 
sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's 
judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of 
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of 
his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is 
within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments run almost into each other. Can we doubt that when the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States were penned and adopted, the 
language of Lord Camden was relied on as expressing the true doctrine on the subject of 
searches and seizures, and as furnishing the true criteria of the reasonable and 
"unreasonable" character of such seizures?" Boyd, supra@ 630. (Emphasis mine). 
21 6. The Boyd Court concluded that the authors of the Constitution would have never 
22 approved of the Acts considered by that Court. The Boyd Court pointed out that the struggles 
23 against arbitrary power in which they had been engaged for more than twenty years, would have 
24 been too deeply engraved in their memories to have allowed them to approve of such insidious 
25 disguises of the old grievance which they had so deeply abhorred. Id. 
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7. The Boyd Court also pointed out that one cardinal rule of the court of chancery is 
never to decree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of a crime, or to forfeit his 
property. Id. @ 631. And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or 
compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to 
forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. Id. @ 631-2. It was 
abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it was abhorrent to the instincts of an American. Id. 
@ 632. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere 
of political liberty and personal freedom. Id. The Acts under consideration by the Boyd Court 
addressed both forfeitures and penalties. Id. 
8. Appellant doesn't know Idaho tax law very well, but would venture that ifhe filed a 
return late and owed a tax there would be penalties involved. 
9. The US attempted to argue that the Acts in question could be saved constitutionally if 
they were held as embracing civil suits for penalties and forfeitures with an information being 
not technically a criminal proceeding. Id. @633. 
10. The Boyd Court held that even the Acts in question were not within the literal terms 
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution any more than it is within the literal terms of the 
Fourth that fact alone did not relieve the proceedings or the law from being obnoxious to the 
prohibitions of either. Id. The Boyd Court held that they were within the spirit of both. Id. 
The Boyd Court, in discussing the relationship of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, wrote: 
"We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They throw 
great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the 
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to 
give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth 
Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against 
himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question 
as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a 
man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially 
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We think it is within 
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the clear intent and meaning of those terms. We are also clearly of opinion that 
proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by 
reason of offences comnritted by lrim, though they may be civil in form, are in their 
nature criminal." Id.@ 633-34. (emphasis mine) 
The Boyd Court pointed out that if the government prosecutor elected to waive an indictment, 
and to file a civil information against the claimants that is, civil in form - that the US, by 
this device, could not take from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of 
their immunities as citizens, and extort from them a production of their private papers, or, as an 
alternative, a confession of guilt Id. @ 634. The Boyd Court held that though the information 
was technically a civil proceeding, it was in substance and effect a criminal one. Id. @ 634. The 
Boyd Court held that a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner 
of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against 
himself~ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the 
equivalent of a search and seizure - and an unreasonable search and seizure - within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. @ 634-5. The Boyd Court held that although the 
proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and 
seizure, yet, as before said, it contained their substance and essence, and effects their substantial 
purpose. Id.@ 635. Years later, along the same lines, as the Supreme Court was applying the 
Fifth Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said: 
'"[A] ... confession .. . must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence ... however 
slight ... the person must not have been compelled to incriminate himself. We have held 
inadmissible even a confession secured by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain 
circumstances, to allow a suspect to call Iris wife until he confessed ... Malloy v. Hogan, 
1964.SCT.40420, 18; 378 U.S. 1 (1964). (Emphasis mine). 
J.C. 7-314 appears relevant to this discussion, "In case of persistence in a refusal of obedience, 
the court may order the party to be imprisoned until the writ is obeyed ... " The Malloy decision 
goes on: 
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" .. .it follows a fortiori that it also forbids the States to resort to imprisonment, as 
here, to compel him to answer questions that might incriminate him. The Fourteenth 
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees against federal infringement -- the right of a person to remain silent unless 
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no 
penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence. Malloy, ,r 19. (emphasis mine) 
Then the Malloy Court says this about Boyd: 
"We relied upon the great case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, decided in 1886, 
which, considering the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as running "almost into each 
other," id., at 630, held that "Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are 
circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's 
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of 
crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of [those Amendments] ... 
." Malloy, ,r 20. (emphasis mine) 
And as to whether the principles enunciated in Boyd applied in the states, the Court said: 
"We said in Mapp [v. Ohio] :"We find that, as to the Federal Government, the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of 
privacy and the freedom from convictions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy 
an 'intimate relation' in their perpetuation of 'principles of humanity and civil 
liberty [ secured] ... only after years of struggle,' Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 
543-544 .... The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is 
complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of 
influence -- the very least that together they assure in either sphere is that no man is 
to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence." 367 U.S., at 656-657. Malloy, ,r 21. 
( emphasis mine) 
1 L As is relevant to the instant case, the Court seems to say cavalierly in Mitchell v. 
Agents of State, 105 Idaho 419; 670 P.2d 520, 526-527 (1983): 
"There remains for consideration petitioner's contentions that the 'Writ violated his Fifth 
Amendment Right Against self-incrimination ... Under existing case law, the present 
showing of the petitioner is facially inadequate to raise a valid Fifth Amendment claim." 
It is comments such as this one that cause Appellant to write at length. After reviewing the case 
law adjudicating LC. 63-3030A it almost seems as though Idaho courts have forgotten or never 
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knew the principles of Constitutional law. It seems that the Court in that case, actually the master 
that was appointed, had either overlooked or forgotten what the Court said next in Malloy: 
"What is accorded is a privilege ofrefusing to incriminate one's self, and the feared 
prosecution may be by either federal or state authorities .. .It would be incongruous to 
have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same 
feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal 
court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in 
either a federal or state proceeding is justified." Malloy,~ 23. (emphasis mine) 
And then it seemed that Court in Malloy anticipated proceedings like LC. 63-3030A when it 
said: 
"It must be considered irrelevant that the petitioner was a witness in a statntory 
inquiry and not a defendant in a criminal prosecution, for it has long been settled that the 
privilege protects witnesses in similar federal inquiries. [Cites omitted] We recently 
elaborated the content of the federal standard in Hoffman: 
"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a 
conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prosecute .... If the witness, upon interposing his claim, were 
required to prove the hazard . .. he would be compelled to surrender the very 
protection which the nrivilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it 
need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it 
is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be 
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." 341 U.S., at 
486-487." (emphasis mine) 
19 12. It seems that modern day Idaho courts, more than 40 years removed from the Malloy 
20 decision seem to want to depart from the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of 
21 person and property should be liberally construed. Idaho courts seem to lean, and this is 
22 especially true with LC. 63-303OA proceedings, to a close and literal construction depriving 
23 rights of half their efficacy leading to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in 
24 sound than in substance. This seems to be especially true with respect to requiring a party to 
25 "prove the hazard". It is as ifldaho courts have forgotten that it is their duty to be watchful for 
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the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Idaho 
court's motto should become obsta principiis. 
Then the Court in Malloy left a toehold that Idaho courts seem to have made every effort to have 
taken advantage of, saying: 
"We also said that, in applying that test, the judge must be" ... perfectly clear, from a 
careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is 
mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to 
incriminate." Malloy, ,r 27. ( emphasis mine) 
The same way no attorney can be perfectly dear that a suspect can say anything to the police 
questioning him, a judge is in no better position. Yet, in LC. 63-3030A proceedings the statute 
makes it ok for a judge to get involved in coercing the defendant into making a confession 
needed to co11ect the tax and penalties under duress of imprisonment and get involved in assuring 
the defendant that everything is going to be ok if he will just file the return/make a 
confession/give up his papers he has a right to be secure in; oh, and let's not forget, pay the tax 
too. It seems like a lot of judges want to get involved in this perfect clarity by fishing around for 
the kind of crime they need to be clear about. The Malloy court addressed this by saying: 
" .. .in the setting in which it [was] asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an 
explanation of why it [could not] be answered might be dangerous because injurious 
disclosure could result," Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S., at 486-487; see Singleton 
v. United States, 343 U.S. 944. Malloy, ,r 31. (emphasis mine) 
As to a judge's attempts to arrive at perfect clarity as to what crimes Appellant might have been 
involved in the Court said in Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City, 350 US 551, 
556-8 (1956): 
"At the outset we must condemn the practice of imputing a sinister meaning to the 
exercise of a person's constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment. The right of an 
accused person to refuse to testify, which had been in England merely a rule of evidence, 
was so important to our forefathers that they raised it to the dignity of a constitutional 
enactment, and it has been recognized as "one of the most valuable prerogatives of the 
citizen." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,610. We have reaffirmed our faith in this 
principle recently in Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155. In Ullmann v. United States, 
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350 U.S. 422, decided last month, we scored the assumption that those who claim this 
privilege are either criminals or perjurers. The privilege against self-incrimination 
would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent 
either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury. As we pointed 
out in Ullmann, a witness may have a reasonable fear of prosecution and yet be 
innocent of any wrongdoing. The privilege serves to protect the innocent who 
otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances." Slochower, supra@ 558. 
( emphasis mine) 
Judge Durtschi's memorandum decision adopted by the Court in Mitchell v. Agents of State, 105 
Idaho 419; 670 P.2d 520, 524-525 (1983) states about Mitchell's Fifth Amendment rights 
assertion, "Under existing case law, the present showing of the petitioner is facially inadequate to 
raise a valid Fifth Amendment claim ... " 
13. The reference by Judge Durtschi to the phrase, "facially inadequate to raise a valid 
Fifth Amendment claim ... " seems to overlook what the Court said in Quinn v. United States, 
349 U.S. 155 (1955): 
" ... the fact that a witness expresses his intention in vague terms is immaterial so 
long as the claim is sufficiently definite to apprise the committee of his intention. As 
everyone agrees, no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege. 
In the instant case, Quinn's references to the Fifth Amendment were clearly sufficient to 
put the committee on notice of an apparent claim of the privilege. It then became 
incumbent on the committee either to accept the claim or to ask petitioner whether he was 
in fact invoking the privilege. Particularly is this so if it is true, as the Government 
contends, that petitioner feared the stigma that might result from a forthright claim of his 
constitutional right to refuse to testify. It is precisely at such times-when the privilege 
is under attack by those who wrongly conceive of it as merely a shield for the 
~-that governmental bodies must be most scrupulous in protecting its 
exercise." Id.@ 163-4. (Emphasis mine). 
14. In addition, Judge Durtschi's comment is seemingly made while being unaware that, 
"The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous 
circumstances." as referenced in the Slochower decision supra. Judge Durtschi's reference to 
"millions of taxpayers" in the Mitchell decision was apparently a reference to people who would 
-20-
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
IO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
rather go along to get along and have better things to do with their time than have arguments 
with the government over the correct interpretation of the tax codes or to even become aware of 
ambiguous circumstances that might ensnare them like the fact that under LC. 63-3076 any 
return Appellant file may be utilized for collection, remission, cancellation or for enforcing the 
penalties prescribed for making false or fraudulent returns. Any return Appellant files may be 
furnished or made accessible to the officers or representatives of the state or county charged with 
the duty of investigating, prosecuting or defending the same; and all such returns and tax 
infonnation and the statements and correspondence relating thereto may be produced in evidence 
in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, directly pertaining to such returns or the tax 
imposed on the basis of such return. In addition, the state tax commission may provide 
information in its possession to a law enforcement agency or prosecutor pursuant to the 
investigation or prosecution of an offense under section 18-915, l 8-1353, 18-1353A, ;-=--=cc.."--'-' 
18-1355 or 18-6710, Idaho Code. Further, under LC. 63-3077 The state tax commission may 
disclose tax returns or tax information to The Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the United 
States or his delegate, or, the proper officer of any state imposing a tax similar to a tax to which 
this section applies, or, the multistate tax commission or its delegate or the governing entity of 
the international fuels tax agreement or its delegate; of any taxpayer making or who may be 
required to make returns, with the state tax commission or may furnish to such officer or his 
authorized representative an abstract or copy of any tax return or tax information or any 
information disclosed by the report of any audit or investigation relating to any taxpayer. Also, 
any duly constituted committee of either branch of the state legislature shall have the right to 
inspect returns upon request. In addition, the state tax commission is authorized and empowered 
to deliver to the county assessor of any county of the state ofldaho information relating to a 
taxpayer's place of residence or domicile. 
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15. In a similar manner that counsel advises his client not to talk to police officers 
2 questioning him because it is unkno¼n to what purpose an answer to the question may serve 
3 officials in obtaining a conviction, there is no way for Appellant to know where the filing of a 
4 return will take him in the maze of ambiguity mentioned above. 
5 16. Judge Durtschi makes what is in Appellant's opinion a smug comment in Mitchell at 
6 page 526 when he opines, "I venture to assume that any young school-boy knows what "wages" 
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and "salaries" are, and that is what is called for on line 10 of the return. Where the "wages" are 
reflected in a W-2 form all the person needs to be able to do is read and write to copy those 
figures on his return." If it is so simple that even a caveman can do it, he should explain why 
there is so much litigation with Idaho Tax Commission listed as one of the parties. Despite the 
Idaho Supreme Court's assertion, by way of the adoption of Judge Durtschi's findings that 
income is easy, the tax code is full of ambiguity; the biggest ambiguity has to do with how a tax 
statute can waive Appellant's right to be secure in his papers and what is written on them; 
especially as those papers that pertain to how Appellant sustained his "RIGHT TO LIFE". 
17. Along these lines, the Court in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (Barnette hereafter) had some comments that pertain in this instant matter: 
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's 
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship 
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections." Id. @ 63 8. ( emphasis mine) 
It looks to Appellant like Idaho legislatures put Appellant's right to be secure in his papers and 
his right not to incriminate himself to a vote when they voted to enact LC. 63-3030A. They voted 
that they could take away his rights to make it easier to collect taxes. 
The Barnette Court said another thing that seems to pertain to this instant action: 
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"'There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature or origin of 
its authority. We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of 
Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent." Id.@ 
641. ( emphasis mine) 
It looks to Appellant like an J.C. 63-3030A proceeding is designed to coerce his consent contrary 
to the Bill of Rights. 
The Boyd Court then went on to make this oft quoted statement: 
""Though It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and ]east repulsive form; 
but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, 
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. 
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for 
the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal 
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation 
of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of 
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any 
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis." Id. @635. 
(Emphasis mine). 
18. In memorandums and letters filed in this instant case, the State cites a number of 
Idaho decision holding that LC. 63-3030A is a.o.k. and violates no rights and is just super. In a 
similar manner, prior to the Court's decision in Boyd, there had been several decisions in the 
Circuit and District Courts sustaining the constitutionality of the law under consideration. Id. @ 
635. Amongst those decisions one "'learned justice" seemed to think that the power to institute 
such searches and seizures was necessary for the efficient collection of the revenue, and that no 
greater objection can be taken to a warrant to search for books, invoices, and other papers 
appertaining to an illegal importation than to one authorizing a search for the imported goods; 
and he concluded that, guarded as the new provision is, it is scarcely possible that the citizen can 
have any just ground of complaint. Id. @ 636. The Boyd Court held that those considerations 
failed to meet the most serious objections to the validity of the law. Id. The Boyd Court said 
about the lower court decisions it reviewed, "We find nothing in the decisions to change our 
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views in relation to the principal question at issue." Id. @ 638. The decisions cited to and relied 
upon by the State make no reference to Boyd or Malloy. They make passing references to the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but make no reference to the Fourteenth Amendment which made 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments applicable in the states. In general, those decisions seem to 
have overlooked that, "Upon the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the 
obligation to guard and enforce every right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceedings before them." Robb v. 
Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884). "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, 
there can be no rulemaking or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436,491 (1966). That Justice Holmes said in Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, "Whatever 
springes1 the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights that the State confers, 
the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the 
name oflocal practice." Id. @24. It is an unassailable proposition that States may establish the 
rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts. Felder v. Casey, l 988.SCT.42869 ,r 
19; 487 U.S. 131 (1988). However, a federal right cannot be defeated by local practice. Id. Also 
Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294,296 (1949). The relative importance to the 
State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for any state 
law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary 
to federal law, must yield. Id. Also Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962). Federal law is 
enforceable in state courts because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much 
laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature. Howlett v. Rose, 1990.SCT.43072 ,r 21; 
496 U.S. 356 (1990).The Supremacy Clause makes those laws "the supreme Law of the Land," 
1 A springe is defined at Dictionary.com as: a snare for catching small game. 
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and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law. Id. The laws of the 
United States are laws in several States, and just as much binding on the courts thereof as the 
State laws are. Id. A state court may not deny a federal right, when the parties and controversy 
are properly before it, in the absence of "valid excuse." Id. @if 23. An excuse that is inconsistent 
with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse: the Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to 
dissociate themselves from federal law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to 
recognize the superior authority of its source. Id. A state may not discriminate against federal 
causes of action. Id. See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 776, n. 1 (1982). 
The Boyd Court concluded its opinion: 
"We think that the notice to produce the invoice in this case, the order by virtue of which 
it was issued, and th.e law which authorized the order, were unconstitutional and void, 
and that the inspection by the district attorney of said invoice, when produced in 
obedience to said notice, and its admission in evidence by the court, were erroneous and 
unconstitutional proceedings. We are of opinion, therefore, that 
"The judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed, and the cause remanded, with 
directions to award a new trial." 
16 19. In Idaho State Tax Commission v. Payton, 688 P. 2d 1163, 1164 (Idaho 1984) 
11 (Payton hereafter) appellant contended that the imposition of an income tax is prohibited by the 
18 Idaho and United States Constitutions. The Court held that the appellant's position was without 
19 merit and cited to Shaffer v. Carter. 252 U.S. 37 (1920)(Shaffer hereafter) wherein the United 
20 States Supreme Court ruled: 
21 "'The rights of the several states to exercise the widest liberty with respect to the 
imposition of internal taxes always has been recognized in the decisions of this court .... 
22 
23 
24 
25 
"That a State may tax callings and occupations as well as persons and property has long 
been recognized ... 
This part of the ruling relied upon by the Court is alright as far as it goes. The Shaffer Court 
continued: 
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"Unless restrained by provisions of the federal Constitution, the power of the state as 
to the mode, form, and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the subjects to which it 
applies are within her jurisdiction." (Citations omitted). (Emphasis mine). 
The purpose of this memorandum has been to point out, and place emphasis on this phrase from 
this opinion, "Unless restrained by provisions of the federal Constitution". It looks to Appellant 
like Idaho courts have completely overlooked restraints imposed by the federal Constitution as 
are described above. Restraints of the federal Constitution may not matter to, or be asserted by, 
the "millions of taxpayers" Judge Durtschi makes reference too in Mitchell, but, they matter to 
Appellant and he is asserting them as evidenced by this writing. The Sheffer Court continued: 
"And we deem it clear, upon principle as well as authority, that ... a state may impose 
general income taxes upon its own citizens and residents whose persons are subject to 
its control...". 252 U.S. at 51-52. 40 S.Ct at 225. (emphasis mine) 
Payton concludes the thought by saying, "Hence, a state imposed income tax does not violate the 
Federal Constitution." Appellant is not going to let this Court tum all of his above arguments and 
authority into a strawman argument that he contends the income tax violates the Federal 
Constitution. H does contend that issuing a mandate compelling him to file a tax return under 
authority of LC. 63-3030A would violate his rights. It is amazing to Appellant trained legal 
minds sitting in Idaho Supreme Court could quote from the Scheffer decision that includes the 
statement " ... a state may impose general income taxes upon its own citizens and residents whose 
persons are subject to its control ... " and not ascribe legal meaning to the phrase. Appellant 
begins his analysis with some questions, what is the State ofldaho? When the State ofldaho is 
described as a piece of dirt lying within certain geographical boundaries, dirt is in no position to 
control anyone; citizens, residents, persons, or sojourners. Next question: Is everybody 
physically present in the geographical boundaries of the State ofldaho controlled by the State of 
Idaho? If you start applying the minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 US 310 (1945) you discover that it is not everyone physically present in the State of Idaho 
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that is subject to the State's control. Next Appellant looks to the Constitution of the State Of 
Idaho, Article I Declaration of Rights and finds: 
Section 1. Inalienable rights of man. All men are by nature free and equal, and have 
certain inalienable rights, among which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing 
safety. 
To Appellant this indicates that not even the Citizens or residents of the geographical area of 
Idaho are "subject to the state's control" as that is the opposite to being "free". How about this 
then? Those subject to the State's control are those ''the supreme court or any district courts" are 
authorized to issue a writ of mandate to by LC. 7-302: 
" ... any inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, to compel the performance 
of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or 
station ... " 
In Total Success Invest. v. Ada Highway Dist., 227 P. 3d 942,950 (IdahoApp. 2010) (Total 
Success hereafter) a proceeding involving Idaho Code§ 7-302 wherein the "WaMu" was named 
as a defendant, it was held: 
Idaho Code § 7-302 only grants courts with the authority to issue writs of mandate 
against parties that owe a duty "resulting from an office, trust or station." As the 
district court found, WaMu does not owe such a duty. TSI conceded that WaMu was not 
a proper party during the hearing in 2008 but made no effort to dismiss WaMu. Id.@ 
950. (emphasis mine) 
A review of all appellate decisions in Idaho involving LC. 63-3030A reveals that appellate courts 
of Idaho have never discussed or diminished this requirement. With respect LC. 7-302's 
reference to "corporation, board or person" the Total Success decision sheds additional light on. 
It is not EVERY "corporation, board or person'' courts have authority to issue writs of mandate 
too, but ONLY those parties that owe a duty "resulting from an office, trust or station." 
Interesting to note that even a "person", a term to which Appellant ascribes legal import and 
considers a term of art, must owe their duty as a result of holding an "office, trust, or station". He 
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states in his verified response to the District Court's alternative writ filed with this Court at 
paragraph 4: 
" ... I am unaware of any involvement on my behalf involving an office, trust or station. I 
have carefully reviewed the petition of the State ofldaho looking for the establishment of 
my involvement in an office, trust or station. If the State of Idaho is aware of my 
involvement in an office, trust or station they do not set forth the facts establishing that in 
their petitions/complaints that I have found." 
20. Which brings Appellant to those dastardly W-2 information forms possessed by the 
state, obtained by way ofI.C. 63-3037, "Information returns. (a) All persons, in whatever 
capacity, including ... employers, making payment to another person ofinterest, rent, salaries, 
wages, except as provided by subsection (b) of section 63-3035, Idaho Code, and section 63-
3036, Idaho Code, ... shall make returns to the state tax commission setting forth the amount of 
such gains, profits and income, ... Such returns shall correspond to the requirements of the 
Internal Revenue Code". 
21. Most employers fall into the category of "millions of taxpayers" referenced in the 
Mitchell decision; they could care less about whether or not the people that work for them are 
employees as defined in 26 U.S.C. 340l(c), "Employee For purposes of this chapter, the term 
"employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any 
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any 
one or more of the foregoing. The term "employee" also includes an officer of a corporation." It 
would not occur to the typical "employer" that if the people that work for them are not 
"employees" it would not be possible for them to be their employer either. 
22. It seems that in the passage of J.C. 63-3037 is the legislature's doing again what was 
proscribed in Barnett, supra, putting Appellant's right to be secure in his person, papers, and 
effects to a vote. They voted if Appellant elects to work in a corporation he waives his Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. One would have to be a legal scholar to figure out that 
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by working in a corporation the State usurped his right to privacy under the penumbra of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments as they apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
stupid corporate officers got "no dog in the fight" as to whether they have legal authority to 
waive Appellant's rights. They may argue that they are giving the information to the 
government, but alas, it is the government that the Bill of Rights is designed to protect Appellant 
from and keep from nosing around in his affairs. So, the government, again, by putting 
Appellant's rights to a vote, has decided by way of LC. 63-3037 that Appellant has no rights 
when he elects to work at a corporation. In Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) the Court 
said something that seems to apply to the State's statutory attempt to circumvent his rights: 
"What the State may not do directly it may not do indirectly." Id. @ 244. (emphasis) 
To Appellant, what this means, is that the State ofldaho for a lot of years has the information 
returns respecting him wrongfully in their possession. 
23. Now let's address the legal conclusions springing from the Affidavit of Kimberly 
Wind in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (WindAffi hereafter). In Mathauser v. 
Hellyer, 560 P. 2d 1325, 1326 (Idaho 1977) it was held that affidavits that draw legal 
conclusions were ineffectual. 
The WindAffi piles legal conclusion on top of legal conclusion. It draws the conclusions that 
Appellant was an "employee" who earned "wage income". It draws to conclusion that that "wage 
income" was effectively connected to the United States. It draws the conclusion that Appellant 
was paid in something the State of Idaho has authority to make an exaction of as described in 
Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108. 111 US 701, 707 (J 884) (Powers of taxation of the State 
should be exercised are within the discretion of its Legislature, except as restrained by its own 
constitution and that of the United States; and, Article I § JO Clause 1: ''No state ... make 
anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts ... ". "The legal-tender act had no 
reference to taxes imposed by State authority, but only to debts, in the ordinary sense of the 
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word, arising out of simple contracts, or contracts of specialty, which include _judgments and 
recognizances.") 
Appellant concludes with a quote out of Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795) that it is his 
hope will stir up the patriotism of both this Court and the Deputy Attorney General and help 
them both better understand the meaning of the oaths they took to uphold the Constitutions: 
"What is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty 
hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are 
established. The Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of 
the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the 
Legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it. The 
life-giving principle and the death-doing stroke must proceed from the same hand. What 
are Legislatures? Creatures of the Constitution; they owe their existence to the 
Constitution: they derive their powers from the Constitution: It is their commission; 
and, therefore, all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void. The 
Constitution is the work or will of the People themselves, in their original, sovereign, 
and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the Legislature in their derivative 
and subordinate capacity. The one is the work ofthe Creator, and the other ofthe 
Creature. The Constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and 
prescribes the orbit within which it must move. In short, gentlemen, the 
Constitution is the sun of the political system, around which all Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may be the case in other 
countries, yet in this there can be no doubt, that every act of the Legislature, repugnant 
to the Constitution, is absolutely void. Id. @ 308. (Emphasis mine). 
The Vanhorne continues: 
"Could the Legislature have annulled these articles, respecting religion, the rights of 
conscience, and elections by ballot? Surely no. As to these points there was no devolution 
of power; the authority was purposely withheld, and reserved by the people to 
themselves. If the Legislature had passed an act declaring, that, in future, there 
should be no trial by Jury, would it have been obligatory? No: It would have been 
void for want of jurisdiction, or constitutional extent of power. The right of trial by 
Jury is a fundamental law, made sacred by the Constitution, and cannot be legislated 
away. The Constitution of a State is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon by 
the temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with the tide of events; notwithstanding 
the competition of opposing interests, and the violence of contending parties, it 
remains firm and immoveable, as a mountain amidst the strife of storms, or a rock 
in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves. I take it to be a clear position; that if a 
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legislative act oppugns a constitutional principle, the former must give way, and be 
rejected on the score of repugnance. I hold it to be a position equally clear and 
found, that, in such case, it will be the duty of the Court to adhere to the 
Constitution, and to declare the act null and void. The Constitution is the basis of 
legislative authority; it lies at the foundation of all law, and is a rule and commission 
by which both Legislators and Judges are to proceed." Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 
304, 309 (1795). ( emphasis mine) 
"The despotic power, as it is aptly called by some writers, of taking private property, 
when state necessity requires, exists in every government; the existence of such power 
is necessary; government could not subsist without it; and if this be the case, it cannot be 
lodged any where with so much safety as with the Legislature. The presumption is, that 
they will not call it into exercise except in urgent cases, or cases of the first necessity .. .It 
is immaterial to the state, in which of its citizens the land is vested; but it is of primary 
importance, that, when vested, it should be secured, and the proprietor protected in 
the enjoyment of it. The constitution encircles, and renders it an holy thing. We 
must, gentlemen, bear constantly in mind, that the present is a case of landed 
property; vested by law in one set of citizens, attempted to be divested, for the 
purpose of vesting the same property in another set of citizens." Vanhorne v. 
Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304,311 (1795). (emphasis mine) 
"The constitution expressly declares, that the right of acquiring, possessing, and 
protecting property is natural, inherent, and unalienable. It is a right not ex gratia 
from the legislature, but ex debito from the constitution. It is sacred; for, it is further 
declared, that the legislature shall have no power to add to, alter, abolish, or 
infringe any part of, the constitution. The constitution is the origin and measure of 
legislative authority. It says to legislators, thus far ye shall go and no further. Not a 
particle of it should be shaken; not a pebble of it should be removed. Innovation is 
dangerous. One encroachment leads to another; precedent gives birth to precedent; 
what has been done may be done again; thus radical principles are generally broken 
in upon, and the constitution eventually destroyed. Where is the security, where the 
inviolability of property, if the legislature, by a private act, affecting particular persons 
only, can take land from one citizen, who acquired it legally, and vest it in another? The 
rights of private property are regulated, protected, and governed by general, known, and 
established laws; and decided upon, by general, known, and established tribunals; laws 
and tribunals not made and created on an instant exigency, on an urgent emergency, to 
serve a present turn, or the interest of a moment. Their operation and influence are equal 
and universal; they press alike on all. Hence security and safety, tranquillity and peace. 
One man is not afraid of another, and no man afraid of the legislature. It is infinitely 
wiser and safer to risk some possible mischiefs, than to vest in the legislature so 
unnecessary, dangerous, and enormous a power as that which has been exercised on the 
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present occasion; a power, that, according to the full extent of the argument, is boundless 
and omnipotent: For, the legislature judged of the necessity of the case, and also of the 
nature and value of the equivalent." Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 311-312 (1795). 
( emphasis mine) 
Conclusion 
A survey ofldaho court's responses to constitutional defenses in LC. 63-3030A proceedings 
have failed to satisfy the constitutional due process necessity of the appearance of justice. They 
even fail to give a sense of the fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. 
Those published proceedings reveal that Idaho courts have completely failed to secure to 
defendants any constitutional protections whatsoever. The Idaho State Tax Commission has not 
produced a credible witness with first hand knowledge of the facts. It has admitted into evidence 
nothing more substantial than hearsay. In order for its determination to be granted in favor of 
Appellant's opponent, it is faced with the daunting task of overturning a United States Supreme 
Court decision. Wherefore, based upon the above reasoning and authority, Appellant moves this 
Court for an order dismissing this instant case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of 
ability to constitutionally enter the order sought by the State. 
Pro Se '1 
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